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| 20 ноября, 2013

“Political Reform was Not a Result of the Protests.”

The former chief of the Presidential Administration (PA) on Domestic Policy, Konstantin Kostin, who now heads the Foundation for Civil Society Development, revealed the secrets of the personnel policies within the Kremlin in an interview with ‘Izestia’ correspondent Natalia Bashlykova, and talked of the successes of pro-government candidates at the last elections.

NB The decision to bring back elections for the post of governor in the regions was taken when you still worked in the Presidential Administration. Looking back, what do you think now? Was that the right decision?

KK. Absolutely the right decision. The electoral process is the most open and democratic means of allotting power, if only because the number of people who have been attracted to the electoral process is now far greater than before.

NB And how has the return to electing governors affected the performance of the governors themselves?

KK It has had a positive effect on the competence of governance in the regions. Under new conditions the governors are expected to not only be valuable business leaders but to also be politicians who are trusted by the public. The fact that they now have to be elected, obviously means that when making decisions affecting the region, local government officials must take public opinion into account and understand that the social well-being of locals must be considered and that they should respond to the concerns of locals and also any crisis situations which arise, as they happen.

NB And has the ‘municipal filter’ system been justified? Can you now reveal who it was, who thought that up?

KK. There’s no secret here. When the laws governing domestic issues were being drafted - on the initiative of the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vyacheslav Volodin - a systematic approach was adopted which involved the creation of several working groups, who studied and analyzed both Russian and foreign practises. This is what happened in this case and also in many others. So one might say that it was the result of a collective effort by scientists from a number of reputable academic institutions who are experts in the field – they are political scientists and politicians.

As for the municipal filter, well I have already expressed my point of view here: it has proven its worth. This was evident in the last two electoral cycles (in 2012 and 2013.) However candidates should be expected to have the best possible qualifications for the job. I am convinced that a politician who has a good reputation in the region and experience there, will have no problem in gathering the necessary number of votes (signatures) to be nominated as a municipal deputy.

NB Do you think that there is a shortage in Russia of good governors who are able to run their region well? After all, we sometimes hear a report in the press from a trusted source saying: ‘No-one is exactly lining up to be a candidate for the job of governor in this or that region..’

KK. I will leave this kind of statement to the conscience of so-called experts and some journalists. They are not only poorly informed on the subject but they can be arrogant and rude when criticizing other regions where their fellow citizens live. Of course, there are regions which are experiencing economic and social difficulties. However, even in these difficult regions there are always some citizens who are doing well and who are willing to take upon themselves the responsibility of taking part in the electoral campaign to fight for the trust of voters, to prepare a good developmental programme and most importantly to get down to some hard grind work.

NB What exactly are the criteria for the personnel policy? And why is it that everyone knows the United Russia candidates will win?

KK It’s true that at all previous governor’s elections it was the candidates who were either nominated by United Russia, or supported by them, who won. We mustn’t forget that United Russia is a perennial leader of the field among all the parties. Its representatives are active at all levels of administration and it has the longest and best ‘bench’ of candidates of any party. Our Foundation prepared a report on the results of the 2013 elections which analyzed the campaigns in all the regions. We came to the conclusion that the majority of these campaigns were actually run on a ‘referendum’ scenario. In other words the elections were simply a vote of confidence in existing governors, or those who were just carrying out their duties. But this model is also considered as an election. They determine the political status quo and establish who exactly is the political leader in the region, who is the main opponent and who is backing the main opponent.

Competition and openness stimulate the creation of strong regional politicians. After four to five years the referendum scenario will probably be the exception to the rule. It will give way to local competitors. Even in two or three years we will be looking at a completely different model of elections.

NA You initiated the creation of a single integral rating of governors. Why was that? Were you not happy with existing system for rating governors?

KK. In my opinion there was one serious flaw in all existing ratings: they were based solely on the opinion of experts, which is a necessary factor but is not enough on its own. Collecting objective data is much more important: we require sociological information such as an evaluation of the work of regional leaders by people who live in the area, as well as economic factors and what sort of information source is most favoured. All these factors, including the opinion of experts will be taken into account when forming the ratings. I hope that the method of evaluating them which we are now finalizing will be sufficiently open and understandable and will reflect the situation in the regions objectively. I think that we will be able to present the first instalment of this research in mid-December. It will be called ‘Rating on the Competence of Governors.’

NA When you created the Foundation for Civil Society Development you said that you would be studying the protest movement in Russia. Is that what you are doing and if so then what sort of results are you seeing?

KK In November of last year we released a report which analyzed the wave of protests in 2011 and 2012. We looked at statistics, the geography of protests, sociology, the mood in the regions, political preferences and the motivation of those who protested. Of course we are studying all this now as well, but I believe that in the foreseeable future we will not be seeing waves of protest on the same scale as previously.

NA So, why in your opinion did the ‘Bolotnaya’ protests – which gave rise to a number of liberal reforms – disappear in a puff of smoke? And do these reforms mean that the protest movement as a whole has now disappeared?

KK I would not say that the reforms were a result of the protests; they were a natural development in the political movement. Firstly, the people who protested on the Bolotnaya and Sakharov Squares were not demanding liberal legislation with regard to political parties or, say, the election of the governors. These steps had been discussed and prepared for a long time previously. Secondly, in the above mentioned report, we identified a number of reasons why the wave of protest began to decline. The main reason was the imbalance between the motivation of those who came out to protest and the rhetoric of the speakers. For example the protestors were unhappy that following the elections they did not see their representatives taking seats in Parliament. They wanted their voices to be heard, but all they were hearing from the protest platforms were abstract slogans and vague appeals and demands. Another important factor in the decline of protest activity is that in February 2012 the protests turned violent. The organisers began to encourage provocations which meant that the safety of protestors was by no means guaranteed. But perhaps most important of all was the gap between what the protestors and the speakers wanted: the majority of the speakers were spouting anti-Putin rhetoric while half of the protesters actually voted for Vladimir Putin in the March 2012 Presidential elections.

As for the general mood of protests, it was only the white ribbon movement which disappeared, to use your terminology, in a puff of smoke. In a democratic society, civic discontent cannot simply disappear. It is a sign of political health. But it does not always take the form of protests and street demonstrations.

NA What was the main mistake that the opposition leader Alexei Navalny made? Does he have a future as a politician within the present day system?

KK. I have said more than once that Navalny’s decision to stand in the elections for Mayor of Moscow transformed him from a blogger and civic activist into a politician who is trying to get support from voters in the electoral process. However, one must understand that his success in the Moscow elections was to a great extent the result of various circumstances, many of which were not dependent on him at all. Some people voted for Navalny because he was a member of the protest movement; some because he was young; some because they knew Sobyanin was going to win and simply wanted to support the alternative candidate and some because they thought that if they voted for him they would secure his freedom. For others he was the personification of the ‘against everyone’ vote. But all this is an extremely shaky foundation for the foundation of an electoral nucleus.

As for the future, well much depends on Alexei Navalny. Politics is structured in such a way that it is not enough to get a good result in elections. It is also necessary to prove to the people who voted for you, every day in every way, that they have made the right choice. It will therefore be very difficult for Alexei Navalny to succeed. He tackled the subject of the fight against corruption very well, but this, on its own, is not enough to create a party or a successful campaign within the Moscow City Duma His chances of doing this look entirely unconvincing. He often makes mistakes and rushes to criticize yesterday’s supporters. One only has to look at the ‘Russian March’ debacle. (Navalny was widely criticised by Russian liberals for attending the Russian March - a nationalist demonstration with strong far-right connections. Translator’s note)

NA How do you assess the results of party reform? And how long will the multi-party system exist for?

KK In our country the multi-party system existed from the moment that the new Russian Government was elected in 1991. And there is no reason to say that it is over. In fact, Vladimir Putin declared in his pre-electoral article ‘Democracy and the Value of Government’ that ‘political competition is the nerve of democracy and its driving force.’ So you have no need to worry about the continuing existence of the multi-party system.

However, if you are talking about the fate of the sixty odd parties which have been registered in the past few years, then this is a different issue. The Foundation, of which I am the head, has recently finished work on a report on the party system in Russia. One can already come to some conclusions from the period of rapid proliferation of political parties. Vyacheslav Volodin spoke at a seminar meeting for deputy governors on domestic policy and in his words: ‘Our party system has been evolving over the past two years and now has certain definite contours. It has emerged from the foundation of basic parliamentary parties. There were eight new big parties. The rest registered as parties but have not yet been able to place their candidates in regional parliaments.’

Now we are about to see the next important step – improving the efficiency of the existing party system. In modern democracies there is a consensus about the role of parties and this is that they should promote broad popular representation in government. In some countries this process has become legislation.

For the system to work effectively one needs to consider measures that would stimulate the development of political parties while solving the problem of political representation and filtering out those who are not engaged. There is a theory in marketing that an excessive amount of alternatives complicates informed choice and ends up causing consumer dissatisfaction and frustration. I think this is true for politics too.

NA Will United Russia remain as the ruling party? Does the ОNF (All Russian People’s Front) stand a chance of becoming a party? Has the competition between the two, shaken the political system?

KK The ОNF is a public organisation uniting supporters of Vladimir Putin. There is no basis in my opinion for all this talk about ‘competition’ because United Russia is simply an interface of the ‘Front’, securing through legislation the realisation of ideas generated within the framework of the ОNF.

I believe that in the coming years United Russia will be the leading political force and has every chance of gaining a majority in the parliamentary elections of 2016. However, it will be up to the voters to decide whether or not it will be the absolute power or a relative power.

NA Is there competition between Putin and Medvedev? Has there been a change in the position of the elite following the presidential election?

KK The elite has always been focussed on Vladimir Putin. I’d like to remind you here that it was he who put forward Dmitri Medvedev as the Presidential candidate. It was this that secured the consensus and mobilization of the voters back in 2008. Putin’s electoral rating amongst voters was always higher than Medvedev’s even when Medvedev was President. The support group for Medvedev has always existed within Putin’s electoral sphere. As a matter of fact one can say the same about many other contemporary politicians. The fact is that the ideological and evaluative framework surrounding Putin’s majority (and this includes the market economy, democracy, patriotism, social stability and social security) means that the majority of Russians from all sorts of diverse social groups are united around the incumbent president.

NA You are credited with coining the term ‘nationalization of the elite’ which was a course adopted by the authorities last year. How successful is this process and is it possible to say that it is now completed?

KK. If one were to take the formal, legislative angle, then laws have been passed which prohibit civil servants from having overseas bank accounts and stocks and shares. This is an extremely important measure when dismantling corruption among the elite. In this sense the process is finished and result has been achieved.

If we approach this problem more broadly however, then we should not be looking only at corruption among officials. The formation of a new national identity should involve all sectors of society and especially the elite, which includes artistic, scientific and business leaders in their fields. We are not talking here about prohibitive measures alone as some so called specialists are insisting. At the end of the day it does not matter who lives where and in which country he does business. In fact it is important for our country that Russian companies should find new markets and that our scientists should be given the opportunity to use advanced facilities in leading centres around the world.

We are talking here about the consensus of all important bodies in society on issues that in any civilized country are immutable truths: common values such as a love for one’s Motherland, a respect for its history and the desire to succeed in one’s own country. Therefore the ‘nationalization of the elites’ can be regarded as a policy which forms a single consensual space around the State, its interests and those of the people within it.

At a round table discussion in August 2012 when the term ‘nationalization of the elites’ was heard for the first time, I quoted the words of the poet Joseph Brodsky from his essay ‘View from a Carousel’ where he says that the true equivalent of a third World War is the prospect of economic war.. The battleground for this war may take place on an international field but the triumphal march will always be a national one – celebrated in the land of the victors.