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| 30 июля, 2013

Dispelling Political Myths

'Vedomosti' Daily Newspaper Publication

By Konstantin Kostin

There is now virtually a consensus in the expert community that the political system in this country is not only going through important changes but is actually working under new rules in a new reality.

The vector of these changes is clear to see. Vyacheslav Volodin, the First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration drew attention to the following indicators of this change at a recent meeting with political scientists: the provision of political competition; transparency and legitimacy of electoral procedures and improvement of the quality of representation.

What were once apparently canonical, well proven qualities of the administration and management of political processes are now undergoing clear changes. We now have an efficient electoral strategy and very different requirements for both governmental and opposition members taking part in the elections. New practises are dispelling established political myths which have been regurgitated year after year in speeches and reports by critics of the Russian political system and the media.

Myth 1: Do Not Allow the Opposition to Take Part in Elections

One of the most widespread myths is the accusation, levelled at the authorities by the opposition, that Kremlin allegedly seeks to restrict the participation of political parties in elections. Let’s examine this more closely. Even if one takes a formal approach we have the following figures to hand: there are 72 political Parties in the country and 87 organising committees which will take part in the election campaign in the Autumn of this year. 37 of these have been declared political organisations and 25 of them considered themselves powerful enough to compete in elections for regional leaders.

Surely, anyone who claims to have an objective political viewpoint would agree that this is a more democratic situation than we have ever seen in the past? The problem is not that the authorities are not permitting candidates to run for election, but on the contrary - that they are letting so many run that there might be complications due to a surfeit of them. And are all these new organisations ready for the reality of political work? We will have the answer on 8^th September.

Despite the many conspiracy theories and negative forecasts which we have been hearing of recently, both Navalni, Gudkov and many others who are harsh critics of government candidates, are not excluded from the election. They are now registered with election campaigns and are indeed campaigning. One should remember that ‘the Invitation to the Elections’ issued by the authorities was a call that echoed loudly in Moscow and the Moscow Region where ‘United Russia’ helped Gudkov and Navalni themselves overcome the municipal filter system.

However, ensuring that there are fair conditions for political competition and participation in elections does not mean that newcomers will have an easy ride or get some sort of preferential treatment over older participants. Elections are a serious business and the fight for election during a real campaign is a very different thing to other forms of campaigning on the Internet or on the street.

Moreover, participation in the actual elections and worse still the mistakes made whilst campaigning, bring with them the risks of a very non-virtual downfall. Suffice it to recall the crushing defeat of Boris Nemtsov in the elections in Sochi. When the ambitions of a politician do not tally with the real level of his popularity it can be a real blow not only to the pride of the politician but also to his future prospects.

Myth 2: The Party in Power wants to Win at any Cost.

This myth emerged in 2005-2006, when ‘United Russia’ won every election to the legislative assemblies. United Russia was indeed gaining momentum at that time. But to talk of some sort of monopoly or a desire to win at any cost would be an over-exaggeration, although it is fair to say that there were a great deal of complaints with regard to administrative resources which were supported by judicial decisions and election commission protocols. And the party in power does not always come out on top. For example, in October 2006 in Samara, Viktor Tarkhov was fairly elected as Mayor and in May 2007, the Communist Roman Grebennikov was elected in Volgograd. Meanwhile for many years another member of the Communist Party Nikolai Vinogradov has been in power in the Vladimir Region. And that is just a couple of the most striking examples.

A watershed moment came in October 2012 with the first single day of voting following the political reforms. There were no restrictions. There were no complaints about opposition candidates being forced to withdraw. There was a wealth of possibilities – the attitude was: ‘take these opportunities and use them.’ And what became of those who were most vociferous in demanding reform? Nothing. They did not even take part in the vast majority of the elections - neither Municipal nor Governorial elections. For example, during the elections for regional parliaments, ‘RPR-Parnas’ fielded candidates in only one out of six regions, and in the elections to the municipal assemblies of the Regional Administrative Centres they fielded candidates in only one out of seven regions.

Following this campaign, the myth of the party in power securing victory at any cost shifted slightly. Some researchers took it upon themselves to claim that the Kremlin was implementing a new technology – the appointment of heads of areas through elections. The municipal filter was being used, they said, as a tool to screen undesirable candidates and thus ensure a guaranteed result. Today the filter is coming under attack from both loyal, independent and opposition politicians and experts. However no-one is claiming that the municipal filter is the only tool that allows one to assess the qualifications of potential candidates – ie their understanding of the problems in the region and their ability to interact with representatives of the municipalities with whom they would have to work if they were victorious. It is this which leads to efficient and professional governance in national regions and affects the standard of living of the people living there. Incidentally, the so called ‘insurmountable’municipal filter was frequently and successfully overcome by opposition candidates in the 2012 elections. At the meeting with political scientists referred to earlier, Volodin said: ‘It would be good and useful for the development of political competition if other regions could follow the example of Sergei Sobyanin and Andrei Vorobyov in helping opposition candidates to take part in elections.’

Myth no 3. The Political struggle is taking place on a battlefield between two warring Parties – the Internet and the Television

One of the reasons this myth is so widespread is because the wave of protest which occurred in late 2011 to mid 2012 was associated with the use of various online tools to mobilise protesters – especially in the first stage. There is a widespread misconception about the high level of politicisation of the Russian Internet – Runet. This is not true. According to research by Pew Research, in 2012 only 31% of Russian social network users were discussing political topics and this equates with the norm in Europe.

The illusion that the Internet is the home of the opposition and therefore, unlike TV creates a certain political mood, is easily explained and is connected with the very nature of communication on the net. With time, a person starts to think that his ‘friends’ on social networks and sites that he visits regularly, are representative of the views of all network users. The political side of Runet is clearly segmented by ideological and party preferences and these segments hardly overlap at all. For the Communist the internet will always be ‘left wing’ and for the liberal it will be Liberal. The political momentum of recruiting new supporters does not happen here. Yuri Saprikin had this to say about the ‘white-ribbon’ opposition segment of social media: ‘We are used to living in a closed world where strangers are kept out by invisible “face-control” screening.’

We should not be talking about the Internet Party and the TV Party, when those who use the internet and watch TV are virtually undistinguishable from each other: they are the same people who consume the same content. Yes, and can it be otherwise in a situation where 65 million Russians use the Internet? TV and the Internet are definitely dovetailing: TV news channels increasingly quote internet sources and blogs on social networks discuss TV programmes – both informative and ones that are pure entertainment.

It is not right to think that political movements which are emerging on the internet will lead to the break down or substitution of classical political institutions. One can cite the Pirate Party in Germany as an illustration of this point. Thanks to the internet, it gained popularity among the young and its’ candidates were voted in to a number of regional parliaments. Its’ success was short lived and its’ popularity fell as quickly as it had grown. Mostly because the large German Parties (CDU and SPD) quickly adopted the technology being used by the Pirates and began to put it to their own use. This is true for Russia too. The Internet is becoming a normal and increasingly important tool for political work. But despite the importance of the net as a channel of political communication, one should not forget that the important issue of political power is not decided by the number of ‘likes’ on social networks but by votes at the elections. If it were there would be a great deal of disappointment.

New Times – New Myths

Some myths live on for years and some are created here and now. For example there is an all-consuming notion among some experts at present that protest activity and questions about democracy are now moving out of the capital and into the regions. There is also a theory of a hitherto unprecedented rift among the elites. A number of researchers even accuse the authorities of ignoring their social obligations in the paradoxical combination with a conservative political agenda. Some of these ideas are na?ve and some are controversial. They are hypotheses and not yet myths. Only time will tell whether or not they will possess the minds of the people and pass the test of the new reality.